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Abstract
During the 1990s, the New Zealand health sector went through a decade of turbulence with a
series of major structural changes being introduced in a relatively short period of time. The new
millennium brought further change, with the establishment of 21 district health boards and the
restoration of a less commercially-oriented system. The sector now appears to be more stable.
However many incremental changes are in train and there has been considerable turbulence below
the surface as key players jostle for position. This paper reports on some of the recent changes
that have occurred in the restructuring of the New Zealand health system. Three issues are
discussed: the devolution of funds and decision-making to district health boards, developments in
primary health care, and the position of the private health insurance industry.
Introduction
The New Zealand health system has gone through a series
of fairly radical structural changes over the past decade or
so. Most notable – and most radical – were the 1993 so-
called "health reforms" in which an attempt was made to
introduce market-like incentives into the system by
requiring public and private providers to compete for
service contracts from public purchasers. Although it was
probably too early to expect any major improvements in
health sector performance, the general consensus that
emerged from policy analysts was that the new system was
unlikely to achieve any significant efficiency gains [1-3].
The competitive arrangements were also rather alien to
many of those working within the health system who
were more accustomed to a public sector style of philoso-
phy [4].
The new millennium brought yet another round of
restructuring following the election of a Labour-led coali-
tion government. The general direction of change this
time around was towards a more planned and commu-
nity-oriented system, with 21 district health boards
(DHBs) being responsible for meeting the health and dis-
ability service needs of the people living within their dis-
trict. The aims of the restructuring into DHBs are set out
in the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act
2000. In addition to providing appropriate health and
disability services for all New Zealanders, the objectives
are to reduce health disparities (especially by improving
the health outcomes of Mäori); to foster community par-
ticipation (via elected representatives, openness of deci-
sion-making and community consultation on strategic
planning); and to facilitate access to and dissemination of
information pertaining to service delivery.
A strong primary care system is seen as central to improv-
ing the health status of the population generally and,
more particularly, to reducing health inequalities. The
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government has therefore given priority to implementing
the Primary Health Care Strategy [5]. The strategy is com-
plex and multi-pronged, and includes changes to both the
organisation of primary health services and to the level
and method of subsidising these services.
As in 1993, the fundamental method of financing health
care through general taxation has remained unchanged
during this latest round of reform. While the share of pub-
lic spending in total health expenditure declined from a
high of 88.1% in 1981/82 to 76.6% in 1992/93, it has
since remained fairly stable at around 77% of total health
expenditure [6,7]. However, after increasing steadily from
2.8% of total health expenditure in 1989/90 to 6.8% in
1996/97, the share of private health insurance in total
funding subsequently declined to 5.7% in 2001/02 fol-
lowing a series of rises in premiums [6,8]. The lack of
growth in membership of private health insurance,
together with the subsidisation of private insurance in
Australia, has encouraged the health insurance industry to
lobby the government for a greater role for private insur-
ance in financing the health system.
We are now three years into the new structure. The DHBs
are well-established, with the second round of elections
for board membership having taken place in October
2004. DHBs have been active in working with primary
health care providers to establish networks of providers
called Primary Health Organisations (PHOs) and by April
2005, 77 PHOs had been established covering more than
90% of the population [9]. While significant progress has
been made away from the commercially-oriented envi-
ronment that prevailed during the 1990s towards a more
community-focussed health system, the path has not
always been smooth. This paper describes and discusses
three particular issues: the process of devolving funds and
decision-making to the DHBs, developments in the pri-
mary health sector, and the private health insurance
lobby. To place the issues into a historical and political
context, the paper begins with a brief overview of the New
Zealand health system and its development. Each of the
three issues is then described and discussed in more
detail.
Overview of the New Zealand health system
The roots of the New Zealand health system as it is today
were first formed through the Social Security Act 1938
when the (Labour) government of the day outlined its
vision of free health services for all New Zealanders,
regardless of ability to pay. However widespread opposi-
tion from the medical profession meant that the Act was
never implemented in full [2,10]. Instead, a dual system
of funding emerged in which mental health, maternity,
and hospital services were fully funded by the govern-
ment, while GPs retained the right to charge a fee over and
above any subsidy for general practice consultations. A
dual system of provision also emerged, with most primary
services being provided in the private sector but most sec-
ondary and tertiary services being provided by public hos-
pitals. As public provision of hospital services expanded,
the number of private hospital beds initially declined.
However, the introduction of private medical insurance in
the early 1960s, together with subsidies for the mainte-
nance of private hospitals, eventually reversed this trend.
[10,11].
By the 1970s, concern was growing that "the fragmented
pattern of health care delivery means that New Zealand
lacks a national health service" [12]. After a series of
reviews and proposals, 30 local hospital boards were
eventually gradually replaced by 14 area health boards
between 1983 and 1989. The funding and provision of
public health services and public hospital services were
amalgamated under area health boards. However, pri-
mary medical services remained separately funded and
provided. Thus the vision of a "national health service"
remained illusive.
Area health boards had a number of features that were
subsequently reintroduced in 2001 as part of the district
health board structure. These features include:
• governance by a locally-based and (mostly) locally-
elected board;
• funding by means of a population-based formula;
• a reorientation away from curative services towards pre-
vention;
• planning of services in consultation with key stakehold-
ers;
• a more strategic approach to health service delivery,
including the use of national goals and targets.
Establishment of the 14 area health boards had not long
been completed before they were abolished in 1991 and
the so-called 'purchaser-provider split' was introduced in
1993 following two-years of preparation. In reality the
split only applied to those services that had previously
been provided by the area health boards: that is, public
hospital services, public health services, and a limited
range of community-based services. The roles had always
been separated for most primary health services and no
attempt was made to apply the principle to privately-
funded hospital services. The main objective of separating
the roles of purchaser and provider was to secure effi-
ciency gains by introducing market-like incentives into
the health system and requiring a more commercialAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/9
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approach to health service delivery. The separation also
effectively allowed, for the first time, funding for all per-
sonal health services (i.e. including primary health serv-
ices) to be amalgamated into a single funding stream.
Funding for public health services was initially "unbun-
dled" and given to a separate purchasing agent so as to
ensure that these funds could not be spent instead on
treatment services. However, these arrangements were
short-lived and from 1996 the same purchasing authori-
ties became responsible for both personal and public
health services (although funding for public health serv-
ices remained ear-marked specifically for this purpose).
Between 1991 and 1997, the formal locus of responsibil-
ity for purchasing health services shifted from local pur-
chasing (under 14 area health boards), to regional
purchasing (under 4 regional health authorities) to cen-
tral purchasing (under a single health funding authority)
[13].
The nature and impact of these changes have been dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere [1,3,10,13]. Of relevance for
this paper is the fact that, while funding for primary
health care had effectively been merged with the funding
of other services, New Zealand still lacked a coordinated
national health system. The system was unplanned and
often uncoordinated, service delivery was still fragmented,
and problems of access to primary medical care due to
high patient copayments remained. In addition, the
Labour party, which won the right to lead a coalition gov-
ernment following the 1999 election, was ideologically
opposed to "a model which promotes competitive tender-
ing for contracts" [[14], p4].
Restructuring commenced once again early in 2000, the
key aim being "the restoration of a non commercial sys-
tem, with the focus on the provision of quality services"
[[14], p.4]. Responsibility for purchasing services was
transferred from the central purchasing agent (the Health
Funding Authority) to the Ministry of Health as a tempo-
rary measure until the 21 DHBs could be established. As
noted above, DHBs have a number of parallels with area
health boards. However the range of services covered by
DHBs is wider than those covered by area health boards.
Most significantly, their responsibilities include primary
health services as well as secondary and tertiary care. Some
of the issues that have arisen during the process of devolv-
ing funds and decision-making to the DHBs are discussed
in the next section.
Devolution of funds and decision-making to 
district health boards
Between 1993 and 1999 when the purchaser-provider
split arrangements were in place, health services were pur-
chased from providers largely on a cost-and-volume basis.
A return to population-based funding at the district level
therefore requires some redistribution of funds across the
21 districts. The formula that is now being used for deter-
mining a district's share of public funding takes into
account the demographic make-up of each district, plus
additional adjustments for unmet need, overseas visitors
and the degree of rurality. Perceived problems with the
population-based funding formula mean that many
DHBs remain unhappy with their resultant quotas. These
perceived problems include: systematically inaccurate
population forecasts (primarily as a result of rapid inter-
nal migration); inadequate adjustment for people who
have a high need for services but who historically may
have under-utilised these services; no adjustment for new
immigrants who often have special health service needs;
and the possibility of 'medical migration' of people with
on-going special service needs to the larger boards which
are able to provide a more comprehensive service. There
has also been much debate over the speed with which
funds should be reallocated away from those boards
which are over-funded to those that are under-funded.
These issues have created some tensions amongst the
DHBs. In the longer term, the aim of achieving equitable
access to services for all New Zealanders may continue to
be compromised if there are inherent inequities within
the funding formula.
The initial establishment of the 21 DHBs reportedly went
relatively smoothly [15]. In part, this was because, in an
effort to minimise disruption, the number and size of the
DHBs were configured to match the services and implicit
boundaries of the publicly-owned organisations (previ-
ously called Hospital and Health Services). This pragmatic
approach facilitated implementation of the new model
and kept the associated costs down. However it also cre-
ated a rather large number of boards for a population of
only four million. A large number of DHBs increases
transaction costs (for example, of the associated bureauc-
racy and of tracking the flows of patients across district
boundaries) and may result in losses of potential econo-
mies of scale. It has also meant that scarce expertise is
spread very thinly, especially in areas such as Mäori health
and public health [[15], p.100]. The size of the 21 DHBs
varies between about 33,000 and over 430,000 people
[16]. The dynamics, management and issues facing these
21 organisations therefore vary significantly. The aim of
the government to achieve equity of access to services for
all New Zealanders in all regions may be difficult where
there is such diversity amongst those organisations which
are responsible for allocating the funds to providers
within their districts.
While DHB establishment was itself relatively smooth, the
process of devolving funds and decision-making to the
districts has not been trouble-free. Devolution of funds
involved, amongst other things, the transfer of responsi-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/9
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bility for numerous contracts for services from the Minis-
try of Health to the DHBs. The DHBs found that many of
the contracts were either inaccurate or incomplete and in
some cases there were long delays in getting copies of the
contracts [15]. The DHBs therefore did not have the infor-
mation that they required to monitor the services being
provided under the contracts.
Devolution of the funds for some services has also not
occurred as soon as had originally been envisaged. By
early 2005, the Ministry of Health still retained responsi-
bility for the funding of all public health services, and for
disability support services for people aged below 65 years.
The ministry has also retained control over much discre-
tionary spending, so that new money transferred to DHBs
is sometimes already tagged for spending on specific serv-
ices. Reasons for this lack of full devolution of funds are
unclear. It may be associated with a limited capacity in
some DHBs to manage more contracts. More fundamen-
tally, it may reflect a perception on the part of the ministry
that, notwithstanding the desire to encourage responsive-
ness to local needs and preferences, the purchasing of
some services – particularly some public health services –
may be better managed at the national level.
Even when funds have been fully devolved to the DHBs,
this does not imply full autonomy by DHBs in decision-
making. A key feature of the reforms this time around has
been the development by the Ministry of Health of two
overarching national strategies to provide strategic direc-
tion for the health and disability sectors as a whole and to
ensure a degree of national consistency where decisions
are decentralised [17,18]. Strategies have also been drawn
up to guide the development of services for sub-groups of
the population (such as Mäori and older people) [19,20]
and for various sectors of the health system (such as pri-
mary health care) [5]. The 21 DHBs are required to adhere
to the framework and priorities outlined in these national
strategies when drawing up their annual plans and strate-
gic plans, all of which must be signed off by the Minister
of Health. However the boundaries between the responsi-
bilities of the Ministry and of the DHBs are, as yet, by no
means clear. While the DHB model shifts the locus of
decision-making for the funding and provision or pur-
chase of services to the district level, control over strategic
direction by the central government constrains local deci-
sion-making. Moreover local and national priorities may
sometimes be in conflict.
The minister has sometimes shown some reluctance to
allow DHBs to make decisions about the provision of par-
ticular services in their areas, especially where this
involves some disinvestment in services. For example, on
one occasion the minister reversed a DHB's decision to
stop providing after-hours surgical services in a rural hos-
pital because of concerns about patient safety. This is seen
by some DHBs as the minister interfering with local pref-
erences [[15], p.98]. As the DHBs become more estab-
lished and more experienced, the minister and the
ministry may be more willing to allow the DHBs a greater
degree of autonomy in decision-making. However, these
tensions between the centre and the regions are by no
means unique (or new) to New Zealand. Rather they
reflect the hierarchical nature of a tax-funded system in
which one organisation (the central government) is
responsible for financing the system while other organisa-
tions (the DHBs) are responsible for spending the money.
Developments in the primary health sector
As noted above, recent developments in the primary
health sector include changes both in the way that services
are organised as well as in the method and level of subsidy
for these services. The restructuring involves the grouping
of general practitioners (GPs), primary care nurses and
other primary health care providers under umbrella
groups called Primary Health Organisations (PHOs).
These PHOs are non-profit organisations which contract
with DHBs to provide a comprehensive set of preventive
and treatment services for their enrolled populations.
PHOs are required to involve their communities in their
governing processes, and to work with their enrolees to
develop services that reflect their particular priorities and
needs. In some districts, PHOs have been established on a
geographic basis so that membership is determined by
area of residence. In other districts, people can choose
between two or more PHOs so that PHOs effectively com-
pete both for GPs and for individual patients. PHOs – like
DHBs – vary in size, from around 3,000 patients to over
330,000 [9].
With respect to the funding of primary health care, a key
goal of the government's Primary Health Care Strategy is
to remove the cost barrier that currently deters some peo-
ple from seeking care. Government subsidies for general
practice services (and also for pharmaceuticals) have his-
torically been paid on a fee-for-service basis in New Zea-
land, with subsidies being targeted to low income and
high risk people. Because the subsidy levels have not been
regularly increased with inflation, and because GPs have
retained the right to set their own levels of copayments,
this has resulted in a significant cost barrier for some peo-
ple to GP services [21,22]. In a national survey undertaken
in 2002/03, around 6% of adults reported that they had
not visited a GP within the last 12 months because of cost
[22].
In an effort to remove or reduce this cost barrier, the move
to PHOs is being accompanied by three changes to the
way that government subsidies for primary care are paid:Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/9
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• a change in the way that the general medical service sub-
sidy is paid from fee-for-service payments to GPs to capi-
tation funding of PHOs;
• the phased introduction of higher government subsidies
for general practice services and pharmaceuticals for all
New Zealanders [23];
• a shift from subsidies that are targeted towards high
need individuals towards subsidies that are paid on a uni-
versal basis.
The bulk of government funding paid to PHOs is deter-
mined by two alternative capitation formulas, one of
which – the 'Access' formula – provides a higher rate of
subsidy. This formula applies only to those PHOs in
which 50% or more of their enrolled population is either
Mäori or Pacific, or living in a deprived area (as defined by
the NZDep2001 Index which combines 8 census variables
that reflect aspects of social and material deprivation.) All
other PHOs are paid under the 'Interim' formula at a
lower capitation rate. As the name suggests, payment to
providers at this lower level is intended only as an interim
measure, the intention being to gradually extend the
higher rate of subsidy to all New Zealanders over the next
few years. Higher rates of subsidy are now being paid to
all PHOs for children up to the age of 17 years (since
October 2003) and for those aged 65 years or over (since
July 2004). Subsidies will be gradually increased for other
age groups through until July 2007, at which time the
higher capitation rates will apply to the whole population
[23].
Payment to PHOs by the two different formulas has intro-
duced some inequities into the system and caused consid-
erable concern amongst many people working within the
sector. Because the capitation payment covers all enrolees
in a PHO, wealthier people who belong to PHOs that are
paid under the Access formula will be paying less for GP
consultations than poorer people who belong to other
PHOs.
The differential in the subsidy levels has also stimulated
aggressive – and sometimes acrimonious – competition
between providers in some districts. It has encouraged
PHOs to compete to enlist general practices that have a
high proportion of deprived people on their registers. It
has also encouraged individual practices to actively enrol
particular patients as a means of obtaining eligibility for
higher subsidies through the Access formula [24]. In those
areas where there are both access and interim PHOs,
patients have an incentive to shop around amongst GPs
on the basis of price. From an administrative perspective,
the move from fee-for-service reimbursements to capita-
tion payment has meant that PHOs have had to tackle
many technical difficulties and set up new management
systems during the establishment phase [25]. All of these
pressures have created a rather unstable environment
which does not align with the government's vision of a
primary health sector in which services are specifically tai-
lored to meet the needs of a stable and identifiable popu-
lation.
Preliminary evaluation of the impact of the subsidy
increases on patient fees indicates that the fees being
charged to patients by GPs have not always fallen by as
much as might have been expected, had the subsidy
increases been passed on in full to patients [26]. A survey
of GP fees in February 2004 showed that GPs belonging to
PHOs funded by the Access formula were generally charg-
ing all of their patients fees that are significantly lower
than other PHOs [27]. However fees in other PHOs (i.e.
those paid under the "Interim" formula) were generally
higher than in GP practices which did not belong to a
PHO at all. This indicates that the higher subsidy paid to
PHOs has not always been passed on to patients as the
government had hoped. A later survey found that the fees
charged to people aged 65 and over fell by an average of
24% following the introduction of a patient subsidy for
this group on 1 July 2004 [26]. However fees charged to
these patients had increased by an average of 12% in the
months prior to the introduction of the subsidy.
As a result of the information from this evaluation, the
government is now working more closely with PHOs and
District Health Boards in an effort to ensure that GP fees
are set at reasonable levels. However, subsidy levels are
not automatically adjusted in line with inflation. As long
as GPs retain the right to set their own fee levels, universal
low cost access to primary health care could prove difficult
to achieve and to sustain in the longer term.
Private health insurance
Unlike Australia, private health insurance in New Zealand
is unregulated and, since the abolition of the tax deducti-
bility of premiums in the late 1980s, does not receive any
direct financial assistance from the government. It has
also not been a topic of any significant public debate.
However, the issue is of interest, first, because government
policy towards private insurance industry in New Zealand
contrasts sharply with that in Australia, and second,
because the industry is currently lobbying for change
based upon much the same arguments as those that were
used to support the introduction of the Private Health
Insurance Incentive Scheme in Australia.
In October 2004, the insurance industry published two
reports within two days, both of which lobbied for direct
government assistance to private insurance as a means of
enhancing efficiency, equity and choice within the healthAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/9
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sector [28,29]. The first report was commissioned by the
Southern Cross Medical Care Society, which provides
health insurance to around two thirds of the people who
have private health insurance cover in New Zealand. Writ-
ten in collaboration with some Australians, the report
claimed that the health insurance industry in New Zea-
land faces "serious decline" and that, without government
assistance, health insurance coverage "may halve over the
next 10 years" [[28], p.i]. The proposed solution was a
30% rebate on insurance premiums akin to that in Aus-
tralia. The authors argued that the Australian experience
".....shows that a rebate on health insurance premiums
has boosted coverage to a healthy level, reduced pressure
on the public health system, improved the fairness of the
health system (by the government paying some health
costs of both insured and uninsured people) and gener-
ally secured the future of the health insurance industry"
[[28], p.i].
The second report, published by the Health Funds Associ-
ation of New Zealand (i.e. the body that represents the
interests of the health insurance industry), claimed that
"public health inflation is at record levels" [[29], p.1] and
that such rates of increase "will quickly become unsustain-
able" [[29], p.13]. Based upon an estimated public health
inflation factor of 8% per annum over the last 3 years, the
report projected that public health expenditure would
reach 63% of GDP by 2050! The report went on to suggest
that costs could be contained if contestable funding was
to be introduced into the DHB system. It proposed that
people earning in excess of NZ$38,000 should be
required to purchase their own health insurance, with the
government refunding the amount of their tax that would
otherwise have been used to purchase health services. Any
contributions made by employers should be exempt from
the fringe benefit tax. DHBs would then sell their services
to those people who are privately insured at a price equal
to the true cost of the service. The report claimed that such
a system would encourage both DHBs and individuals (or
their employers) to focus on value for money, thereby
providing the necessary incentives to keep health inflation
down.
Interpretation of the data which form the basis for the
claims made in each of these reports is highly questiona-
ble. This comment applies both to the evidence presented
to illustrate that there is a problem with current financing
arrangements in New Zealand, as well as to the impact of
the proposed solutions. Even the basic premise that pri-
vate health insurance is in serious decline is not well sup-
ported. While the proportion of the population covered
by private insurance has indeed declined from a peak of
around 45% in the late 1980s [30] it has remained fairly
stable at around one third of the population over the past
five years [28]. And although the proportion of insured
with comprehensive cover (as opposed to cover mainly
for hospital services) has declined from 20% in 2000 to
14% in 2004 [28], this could equally reflect improve-
ments in access to publicly-funded primary health services
as much as a response to increases in insurance premiums.
It is also difficult to accept that New Zealand should fol-
low Australia in introducing a 30% tax rebate on premi-
ums. In Australia, the rebate was one part of a package of
subsidies and regulations. Separating out the precise
effects of the rebate from the effects of the other compo-
nents of the package is problematic and requires the adop-
tion of a number of assumptions. Even so, there appears
to be some consensus amongst analysts that, while the
rebate does appear to have stimulated an increase in
insurance coverage in the short term, the size of the effect
may have been less than the government expected, and
may not have been large enough to justify the expenditure
[31,32]. Moreover, recent figures suggest that health
insurance coverage in Australia is now declining [33].
It is even more difficult to justify a subsidy on the grounds
that it will reduce pressure on the public health system. As
Richardson recently pointed out in this journal, in Aus-
tralia, changes in public and private bed numbers indicate
that problems of access to the public health system are
determined primarily by constraints on the supply side,
rather than by an excess demand caused by an inability to
afford private health insurance [34]. Vaithianathan, too,
has shown that the demand for public hospital beds is
unlikely to decline because an insurance subsidy is most
likely to increase insurance coverage of people who previ-
ously paid directly for the use of private hospital beds,
rather than of people who currently use public hospitals
[35]. Even if a subsidy does actually encourage a shift
from the public sector to the private sector, Frech III and
Hopkins have suggested that, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, the optimal subsidy may actually be negative (i.e pri-
vate health insurance should be taxed) [32].
In the second report [29], while the main justification for
a greater role for private health insurance was escalating
costs in the public sector, the meaning of the term "public
health inflation" was unclear. In some instances [e.g. [29],
p.12], the term seems to apply to changes in public health
expenditure, while in other cases it apparently refers to
increases in public hospital costs adjusted for hospital
throughput [[29], p.9]. Neither of these are good indica-
tors of cost increases across all of the services that are pub-
licly funded, but either way, the estimated figure appears
to have been simply extrapolated to the year 2050, thus
producing an estimate of public health expenditure that is
both excessive and, more importantly, newsworthy. Even
if such a figure could be substantiated, there is little evi-
dence from the international literature in support of theAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:9 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/9
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claim that contestable insurance funding is likely to assist
in controlling costs. If anything, total health expenditure
tends to be higher in insurance-funded systems than in
systems that are predominantly funded by general taxa-
tion [36,37]. Reasons for this higher expenditure include
the difficulty of containing costs in a system where there
are multiple purchasers, and where reimbursements are
usually on a fee-for-service basis.
While the government did not respond publicly to the
claims and proposals made by the health insurance indus-
try in these two reports, it did take two decisive actions.
First, it requested briefings from the Treasury on both of
the reports immediately prior to their public release
[38,39]. Second, on the same day that the second report
was published the Ministry of Health released its own
report on the future funding of health services in New Zea-
land [40]. One of the conclusions from this report –
which had in fact been written for the Ministry two years
earlier but which had not been released – was that "there
should be no public subsidies of private health insurance
in New Zealand" [[40], p.xiv]. The main reasons behind
this conclusion were (a) inequalities are likely to be exac-
erbated, because expenditure on private insurance
increases with income; (b) control over health expendi-
ture is more difficult under private insurance than under
direct public funding; (c) greater value is likely to be
achieved by increasing expenditure in the public sector
because service provision tends to be more expensive and
administration costs tend to be higher in the private sec-
tor; and (d) because demand for private insurance is rela-
tively insensitive to price changes, the cost of a health
insurance subsidy will be greater than the value of any
health services that are stimulated by that subsidy.
In summary, while a rebate on private insurance may well
improve the health of the private insurance industry, there
appears to be little evidence that it would make any useful
contribution towards improving the health of New Zea-
landers. More fundamentally, the current government
would require any changes to financing arrangements to
align with the principles which underpin the New Zea-
land Health Strategy. One of these principles is: "timely
and equitable access for all New Zealanders to a compre-
hensive range of health and disability services, regardless
of ability to pay" [[17], p.vi]. As Richardson has noted, the
egalitarian desire of equalising access to health care
regardless of ability to pay, and reducing inequalities in
health are "more easily achieved through a compulsory
public health system" [[34], p.5]. In contrast, contestable
funding and subsidisation of private insurance are more
appropriate for a health system aimed at maximising indi-
vidual choice.
Conclusion
This paper has described and discussed just some of the
issues that currently face the New Zealand health system.
Many of these issues are not new but rather are renewed
manifestations of debates which have been recurrent fea-
tures in various waves of health sector reform. In particu-
lar, the division of responsibilities between the centre and
the regions, uncontrolled copayments for GP consulta-
tions, and the tax treatment of private health insurance are
all issues which have repeatedly challenged decision-mak-
ers.
During any period of change, there are inevitably con-
flicts, tensions and disagreements as new boundaries are
drawn and the various players jostle for position. This cer-
tainly has been, and continues to be, the case in this latest
round of reforms in New Zealand, most particularly in the
primary health care sector. As the system matures, the
boundaries of responsibility across the sector should
become clearer. If the vision of a community-oriented sys-
tem is to become a reality, full devolution of responsibil-
ities from the centre to the districts will be essential as the
DHBs continue to build their capacity, capability and
experience. The Ministry of Health can then focus on pro-
viding strategic direction to the sector and on monitoring
performance through appropriate accountability mecha-
nisms.
In spite of the tensions and difficulties associated with
implementation of the new structure, the sector already
appears to be developing a much stronger sense of direc-
tion and purpose. This is in sharp contrast to the 1990s
when the change towards a more market-oriented system
resulted in a high degree of uncertainty for, and alienation
of, many service providers [41]. Another difference is that
the government has invested in a number of evaluation
projects by health service researchers this time around.
These evaluations should highlight the main strengths
and weaknesses of the new institutional arrangements,
and, where necessary, indicate areas where further adjust-
ments are required.
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